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21I N T R O D U C T I O N
The impact of government expenditure policy on long run growth is an
important policy issue. The emergence of endogenous growth models in the
80’s have provided an useful approach to analyze how government expenditure
policy can inﬂuence on the long run trajectory of the economy. Barro (1990)
pioneered the analysis based on a closed economy deterministic AK growth
model where public spending is productive1. Others, Turnovsky (1998, 1999)
for example, have followed suit incorporating small open economy features,
risk and other issues (such as congestion, for example) into endogenous
growth models where public spending is productive. Thus substantial con-
clusions have been derived concerning the impact of risk and the expenditure
policy of the public sector on the economy, and the optimal size of the
public sector, provided that public spending enhances productivity and vo-
latility. However, there is a recurrent shortage of analysis based on two-
country stochastic models, specially when the integration of ﬁnancial markets
is becoming more complete.
This paper analyzes the inﬂuence of risk and the expenditure policy of the
public sector by incorporating productive public spending [see Barro (1990)]
into a two-country stochastic AK growth model developed by Turnovsky
(1997, Ch. 11). Thus we derive the size of the public sector that maximizes
welfare endogenously, instead of assuming an exogenous size, as in Turnovsky
(1997, Ch. 11). Previous analysis introduced risk into endogenous growth
models, but public spending was neither utility-enhancing nor productive
[see Eaton (1981), for example]. Turnovsky extended Barro’s (1990) closed
economy model by introducing productivity- and volatility-enhancing public
spending into a stochastic endogenous growth small open economy. In addi-
tion, Turnovsky (1998) analyzed the impact of productive public spending
(subject to congestion) in a risky closed economy. Therefore, our model has
been constructed combining the main characteristics of the core literature2:
• It is an AK growth model, as the rest of the models.
• It is a two-country model, following the framework set out by Turnovsky
1Barro (1990) also analyzed the role of utility-enhancing government expenditure.
2We denominate “core literature” to the set of papers that have analyzed the impact
of risk and/or the expenditure policy of the public sector on the economy based on AK
growth models, provided that public spending is productive and no congestion arises, and
to the model developed by Turnovsky (1997, Ch. 11).
3(1997, Ch. 11), whereas the rest of the models are one-country models
(either a closed economy or small open economy).
• Public spending is productive, pioneered by Aschauer (1989) and in-
corporated originally into endogenous growth models by Barro (1990).
Thus the model is able to determine the size of the public sector that
maximizes the welfare of the representative agent, as most of the models
of the core literature do. Turnovsky (1997) is the only model that
cannot analyze the magnitude of such a size, since the public spen-
ding is neither utility enhancing nor productive, so that “it can be
interpreted as being a real drain on the economy or, alternatively, as
some public good that does not aﬀect the marginal utility of private
consumption or the productivity of private capital” (Turnovsky, 1997,
p. 338). Turnovsky (1998, 1999) extend Barro (1990) from a closed
economy to a model with congestion and to a small open economy
setting, respectively.
• The model is stochastic. Barro (1990) is the only model of the core
literature that is not stochastic. Turnovsky (1998, 1999) extend the
deterministic model in Barro (1990) to a stochastic setting.
Table 3.1. encompasses the relationship between the model of this paper
and the core literature.
Table 3.1. An overview of the model
The diﬀerent AK Two Size of the Stochastic
models growth countries public sector shocks
Barro (1990) X X
Turnovsky (1997) X X X
Turnovsky (1998) X X X
Turnovsky (1999) X X X
This model X X X X
This model can be specially useful in the present moment of the European
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). First, countries of the euro area
have adopted the Stability and Growth Pact from 1st January 1999 onwards,
whose objective is that countries of the euro area must attain budget balance,
in the medium or in the long run, so that the assumption of continuous
4budget balance that we make in this chapter seems reasonable. Second, the
emphasis of this paper is the long run and, therefore, it does not focus on
the inﬂuence of business cycles, important as they may be. Finally, there
is a permanent debate about whether the size of the public sector should
be bigger or smaller and, more speciﬁcally, whether more open economies
should have bigger governments or not. This model sheds some light on the
issue, since it compares the size of the public sector that maximizes welfare
in an open economy with that in a closed economy.
This paper is organized as follows. We ﬁrst obtain the world macroe-
conomic equilibrium, given that the size of the public sector is exogenously
given. Then we study the impact of changes in exogenous variables on key
economic variables such as consumption-wealth ratio, the rate of growth of
wealth and welfare. We compare the results derived from an open economy
with those of a closed economy. Next, we derive the welfare-maximizing
size of the public sector. We discuss the diﬀerences arising from maximizing
growth and welfare. Additionally, we analyze whether more open economies
are associated with a higher size optimal of the public sector, even when
public spending is productive-only. Finally, we conclude indicating possible
avenues for future research.
2 THE WORLD ECONOMY
2.1 The basic structure
The world is a real economy composed of two countries, each of them pro-
ducing only one homogeneous good. In each country there exists a represen-
tative agent with inﬁnite time horizon. The homogeneous good produced by
both countries can be either consumed or invested in capital without having
to incur in any kind of adjustment costs. There are two assets: domestic
capital and foreign capital. Unstarred variables refer to the domestic eco-
nomy, whereas the starred variables refer to the foreign economy. Both
the domestic capital, K, and the foreign capital, K∗,c a nb eo w n e db y
the domestic representative agent or the foreign representative agent. The
subscript d denotes the holdings of assets of the domestic representative agent
and the subscript f denotes the holdings of assets of the foreign representative
agent. So it must be satisﬁed that







The wealth of the domestic representative agent, W, and the wealth of the
foreign representative agent, W ∗, therefore will be




∗ = Kf + K
∗
f. (2)
The public sector purchases part of the private ﬂow of production and
utilizes it to supply a productive pure public good to the private represen-
tative agent. Public spending, dG, increases with wealth, so that we can
achieve a balanced growth path3. We specify public spending as follows
dG = gWdt+ Wdz, (3)
where g = G/W denotes the size of the public sector, and dz is the increment
of a stochastic process z. Those increments are temporally independent and
are normally distributed. They satisfy that E(dz)=0and E(dz2)=σ2
zdt.
Domestic production can be obtained using only domestic capital, K,
through a somewhat modiﬁed AK function and it is expressed through a
ﬁrst order stochastic diﬀerential equation
dY = αKdt+ αKdy, (4)
where
α = α + δg − 0.5θg
2. (5)
The term α > 0 is the (constant) physical marginal product of private
capital when the size of the domestic public sector is zero and dy represents a
3Other rules can also achieve a balanced growth path. See Turnovsky (1996) for more
details.
6proportional domestic productivity shock. More precisely, dy is the increment
of a stochastic process y. Those increments are temporally independent and
are normally distributed. They satisfy that E(dy)=0and E(dy2)=σ2
ydt.4
We omit, for convenience, the formal references to time, although those
v a r i a b l e sd e p e n do nt i m e .W em u s tn o t et h a tdY indicates the ﬂow of pro-
duction, instead of Y , as is ordinarily done in stochastic calculus.
The production function incorporates the inﬂuence of the public sector
on the physical marginal product of private capital and on the magnitude of
the stochastic domestic productivity shock by means of a quadratic term in
g. The modiﬁed marginal physical product of private capital, α,i sb a s e do n
Gallaway and Vedder (1995) and Vedder and Gallaway (1998, p. 4). They
refer to what US Congress Representative Richard Armey (1995) termed the
Armey Curve, which is a ﬁgure àl aL a ﬀer relating the size of the public
sector with the rate of growth of the economy (Vedder and Gallaway, 1998,
p. 1). However, the curve relating both variables can, in fact, be found before
in Barro (1990, pp. S110 and S118), or in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995,
p. 155) and thus the Armey Curve should be more conveniently renamed
as the Barro-Sala-i-Martin-Armey (BSiMA) Curve. Here we have converted
that relationship into another one between the size of the public sector and
the marginal physical product of private capital.
Both parameters δ and θ in equation (5) are positive, so that the function
is concave in the size of the public sector, g, and we restrict ourselves to the
case g<δ/θ < 1. Then we assume that the marginal impact of the public
sector on the marginal physical product of private capital is positive, at a
diminishing rate5. In addition, an increase in the size of the public sector
ampliﬁes the magnitude of the impact of domestic productivity shocks, at a
diminishing rate. We could easily introduce into the model the alternative
assumption that an increase in the size of the public sector reduces the impact
of domestic productivity shocks, just changing the signs for the parameters δ
and θ for the stochastic component in equation (5) above. In case δ = θ =0
then we return to a standard AK production function.
This production function captures essentially, albeit in an diﬀerent al-
4That is, the production ﬂow follows a Brownian motion with drift αK a n dw i t hv a r i -
ance α2K2σ2
y.
5It can be easily obtained that the marginal physical product of private capital, α,
becomes a maximum when g = δ/θ. Here we are assuming that the marginal impact of
public spending on α becomes negative for some value of the size of the public sector g<1
and, therefore, that it is negative for g =1as well.
7ternative way, the basic features of models with a productive public sector,
such as Barro (1990), or Turnovsky (1998, 1999) in stochastic settings, and
it makes possible to extend the analysis and to compare our results to theirs.
We have chosen this alternative way of modeling because it is easier to adapt
to a two-country world economy and additionally it can be easily extended
to encompass volatility-reducing features. We should note that here we
introduce the ﬂow of production goods provided by the public sector and not
the stock of accumulated public capital stock.6 Thus, even though we should
postulate it as a stock (being the spending in public physical structures),
that would lead to a transitional dynamics equilibrium (Turnovsky, 1998.
p. 6), and then the literature has usually opted to postulate it as a ﬂow to
be analytically tractable.7 Additionally, we should note that our formulation
implies that only the deterministic component of the public spending in pro-
d u c t i o ng o o d si sp r o d u c t i v e .
The same structure applies to the foreign economy. Foreign public spen-







where g∗ = G∗/W ∗ denotes the size of the foreign public sector, and dz∗ is
the increment of a stochastic process z∗. Those increments are temporally




The foreign economy is structured symmetrically to the domestic eco-
nomy. Thus foreign production is obtained using only foreign capital, K∗,

















6As Turnovsky puts it (1998, p. 5), “In introducing productive government expenditure
one must choose between formulating it as a ﬂow or as a stock, a choice that involves a
tradeoﬀ between tractatibility and realism”.
7See, for example, Barro (1990) and Turnovsky (1998, 1999).
8where α∗ > 0 is the marginal physical product of capital when the size of
the foreign public sector is zero and dy∗ represents a proportional foreign
productivity shock. The term dy∗ is the increment of a stochastic process
y∗. Those shocks are temporally independent and are distributed normally,
satisfying that E(dy∗)=0and that E(dy∗2)=σ2
y∗dt.
2.2 The domestic economy
2.2.1 The problem
The preferences of the domestic representative agent are represented by an









−βtdt;−∞ < γ < 1. (6)
The welfare of the domestic representative agent in period 0 is the expected
value of the discounted sum of instantaneous utilities, conditioned on the
set of disposable information in period 0. The parameter β is a positive
subjective discount rate (or rate of time preference). The utility function
becomes logarithmic when γ =0 . The empirical evidence suggest a high
degree of risk aversion (Campbell, 1996).8 The restrictions on the utility
function are necessary to ensure concavity with respect to consumption.
The domestic representative agent consumes at a deterministic rate C(t)dt
in the instant dt and must pay the corresponding taxes and thus the dynamic
budget restriction can be expressed as
dW =[ αKd + α
∗K
∗




∗] − Cdt− dT, (7)
where dT denotes the taxes the domestic representative agent must pay to
the public sector. We assume that the collection of taxes exactly oﬀset public
spending
dT = dG, (8)
that is, the public sector balances budget continuously.
8The Arrow-Pratt coeﬃcient of risk aversion is given by 1 − γ.
9Combining equations (3) and (8), and substituting them into (7), the
restriction for the resources of the domestic economy is given by
dW =[ αKd + α
∗K
∗




∗ − Wdz]. (9)













= share of the domestic portfolio materialized
in foreign capital,




Substituting those variables into the budget constraint (9) we obtain the


















This equation can be more conveniently expressed as
dW
W
= ψdt + dw, (10)
where the deterministic and stochastic parts of the rate of accumulation of
assets, dW/W, can be expressed in the following way
ψ ≡ nd [α − α
∗]+α
∗ − g −
C
W








∗ − dz, (12)
where ρ ≡ αnd + α∗n∗
d ≡ nd [α − α∗]+α∗ denotes the gross rate of return of
the asset portfolio.
102.2.2 The equilibrium
The objective of the domestic representative agent consists in choosing the
path of consumption and portfolio shares that maximizes the expected value
of the intertemporal utility function (6), subject to W(0) = W0, (10), (11)
and (12). This optimization is a stochastic optimum control problem.9 Ini-
tially we assume that the government sets an arbitrarily exogenous size of
the public sector, g. We analyze the case in which such a size will be chosen
optimally in section 4.
It is important to bear in mind that the domestic agent takes as given the
r a t e so fr e t u r no fd i ﬀerent assets, as well as the corresponding variances and
covariances. However, these parameters will endogenously be determined in
the macroeconomic equilibrium we are going to obtain. We look for values of
the endogenous variables that are not stochastic in equilibrium and then we
show that the results validate the initial assumption that equilibrium values
are not stochastic.











subject to the restrictions (10), (11) and (12), and given initial wealth. The
value function in period 0 is the expected value of the discounted sum of
instantaneous utilities, evaluated along the optimal path, starting in period
0i nt h es t a t eW(0) = W0.
Starting from equation (13) the value function must satisfy the following
equation, known as the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation of stochastic con-















where ψ can be found in (11) and σ2
w denotes the variance of the stochastic
element of the rate of accumulation of assets, given by equation (12).
9To solve problems of stochastic optimum control see, for example, Kamien and
Schwartz (1991, section 22), Malliaris and Brock (1982, ch. 2), Obstfeld (1992), or
Turnovsky (1997, ch. 9; 2000, ch. 15).
11We diﬀerentiate partially equation (14) with respect to C and nd in order











The solution to this problem is obtained through trial and error. We seek
to ﬁnd a value function V (W) that satisﬁes, on the one hand, the ﬁrst order
optimality conditions and, on the other, the Bellman equation. In the case
of isoelastic utility functions the value function has the same form of the
utility function [Merton (1969), result generalized in Merton (1971)]. Thus
we suggest the guess solution
V (W)=AW
γ, (17)








Substituting these expressions into the ﬁrst order optimality conditions





∗)dt =( 1− γ)cov [dw,αdy − α
∗dy
∗] . (19)
These are typical equations in stochastic models in continuous time.
Equation (18) indicates that at the optimum, the marginal utility derived
from consumption must be equal to the marginal change in the value function
or the marginal utility of wealth. Equation (19) shows us that the optimal
choice of portfolio shares of the domestic representative agent must be such
that the risk-adjusted rates of return of both assets are equalized.
12Combining (18) and (19), and substituting them into the equation (14),
we can calculate, after some algebra, the equilibrium portfolio shares and the



























































Please note that neither ∆ nor the variance of the rate of growth of assets,
σ2
w,o, can be negative and the subscript o r e f e rt ov a l u e si na no p e ne c o n o m y .
The equilibrium is characterized by a balanced real growth. The equi-




= ψodt + dwo,














∗ − dz. (25)
Now we can get the equilibrium solution in a closed economy by setting
nd =1and n∗
d =0in equations (21), (23), (24), and (25). We will use the
shares of the domestic portfolio materialized in domestic and foreign capital,
nd and n∗
d respectively, to approximate the degree of openness of the domestic

































dwc = αdy − dz,
where the variables with the subscript c refer to values in a closed economy.
We should note that in case there is no risk, that is, σ2
w,c =0 ,d i ﬀerentiating
equation (28) with respect to the size of the public sector, g,w ec a ns e e
that the rate of growth of assets ﬁrst increases with the size of the public
sector but then diminishes with the size of the public sector, thus implying
the BSiMA Curve referred above.
To guarantee that consumption is positive in the domestic open economy
we impose the feasibility condition that the marginal propensity to consume









For the ﬁrst order optimality conditions to characterize a maximum, the
corresponding second order condition must be satisﬁed, that is, the Hessian
matrix associated to the maximization problem and evaluated at the optimal
values of the choice variables
"
(γ − 1)(V 0(W))
γ−2
γ−1 0
0 V 00(W)W 2∆
#








10See Chiang (1984, pp. 320-323), for example.
14where ∆ > 0 (in a risky economy) was already deﬁned in equation (22).










where C/W is the optimal value pointed out by equation (21). Then we
substitute (29) into the value function (17). Then the value function is given,










w h e r ew ec a no b s e r v et h a t ,g i v e nt h er e s t r i c t i o n so nt h eu t i l i t yf u n c t i o n ,
V 0(W) > 0 and V 00(W) < 0 provided that C/W > 0.
In addition, we impose that the macroeconomic equilibrium must satisfy








Now let us show that should the feasibility condition be satisﬁed then that
would be equivalent to satisfy the transversality condition.11 To evaluate
(31), we start expressing the dynamics of the accumulation of wealth
dW = ψWdt+ Wdw. (32)




Since the increments of w are temporally independent and are normally
distributed then13
11See Merton (1969). Turnovsky (2000) provides, for example, the proof of the
transversality condition as well.
12See Malliaris and Brock (1982, pp. 135-136), for example.











The transversality condition (31) will be satisﬁed if and only if
γ
©




− β < 0.





and thus feasibility guarantees convergence as well.
Finally, we should note that since the public sector equilibrates its budget
continuously then the intertemporal budget constraint of the public sector is
satisﬁed trivially.
2.3 The foreign economy
2.3.1 The problem
The structure of the foreign economy and the problem facing the foreign
representative agent can be formulated in an analogous way to the domestic











The dynamics of foreign wealth are given by
dW∗
























The equilibrium portfolio shares and the consumption-wealth ratio in the






















































and ∆ was already deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n( 2 2 )a b o v e .
The equilibrium rate of accumulation of wealth in the foreign economy
follows the stochastic process
dW∗





























N o ww er e v i e wb r i e ﬂy the impact of changes in exogenous variables on the
c o n s u m p t i o n - w e a l t hr a t i o ,t h er a t eo fg r o w t ho fw e a l t ho ft h ed o m e s t i ce c o -
nomy, and welfare, since most of the results are standard.14 Next, we compare
the results of an open economy with those of a closed economy, provided that
the size of the public sector is exogenously given.
14See Turnovsky (1997, Ch. 11), for example.
173.1 Consumption
The optimal consumption-wealth ratio obtained in equation (21) is standard
in the literature: domestic consumption is a linear function of domestic
wealth.15 To start with, we review the impact of changes in exogenous
variables that are not directly related to risk or public spending on con-
sumption. Thus a higher subjective discount rate, β, increases consumption-
wealth ratio, because the domestic representative agent ﬁnds more attractive
to dedicate a higher proportion of wealth to consumption, thus reducing
investment. In addition, the impact of a higher gross rate of return of the
asset portfolio, ρ, on consumption-wealth ratio depends on the sign of the
parameter γ. That is the overall result of two opposite eﬀects, substitu-
tion and income eﬀects. A higher gross rate of return of the asset portfolio
has always a negative substitution eﬀect since consumption becomes less
attractive whereas investment is more attractive. The income eﬀect on the
consumption-wealth ratio originated by a higher gross rate of return of the
asset portfolio is equal to unity: it makes possible to raise both actual and
future consumption. For example, if γ < 0 then income eﬀect dominates
substitution eﬀect. Thus increasing the gross rate of return of the asset port-
folio, ρ, raises consumption-wealth ratio. From here onwards whenever we
get that the result depends on the sign of the parameter γ only, we focus
o nt h ec a s ew h e r eγ < 0, for being the most relevant situation empirically
[Campbell (1996)].
Second, the impact of variables related to risk, but not aﬀected by the
behavior of the public sector, is reviewed. Thus the eﬀect of a higher
coeﬃcient of risk aversion, γ, on consumption is ambiguous. Additionally, a
higher variance of the rate of growth, σ2
w,o, reduces consumption-wealth ratio
if γ < 0. Substitution and income eﬀects arise again: totally diﬀerentiating
equation (21) it can be easily shown that an increase of the variance of the
rate of growth is equivalent to a fall in the gross rate of return of the asset
portfolio, ρ,o f0.5[1− γ(1 + η)]. Similar conclusion applies to the impact
of a higher variance of domestic productivity shocks, σ2
y, a higher variance
of foreign productivity shocks, σ2
y∗, or a higher covariance between domestic
and foreign productivity shocks, σyy∗, on consumption-wealth ratio.
Third, we review the role of the public sector. A higher size of the public
sector, g, originates a positive productive eﬀect plus a negative volatility
15Pioneered by Merton (1969[1992]) within a context of uncertainty using in continuous
time. We refer to Turnovsky (1997, 2000a) for details more related to our model.
18eﬀect: the net eﬀect depends on which of the eﬀects dominate. For example,
if the net eﬀect is positive, which is equivalent to a rise in the gross rate
of return of the asset portfolio, ρ, then consumption-wealth ratio increases
for γ < 0. Next, an increase in the variance of public spending shocks, σ2
z,
diminishes consumption-wealth ratio when γ < 0.A ni n c r e a s ei nt h ev a r i a n c e
of public spending shocks is equivalent to a fall in the gross rate of return
of the asset portfolio of 0.5[1− γ(1 + η)], since the variance of the rate of
growth increases. In contrast, if either the covariance between domestic pro-
ductivity shocks and domestic public spending shocks, σyz, or the covariance
between foreign productivity shocks and domestic public spending shocks,
σy∗z, increase then consumption-wealth ratio increases for γ < 0.T h a t i s
due to a reduction in the variance of the rate of growth of the domestic
economy.
For the case that the utility function is logarithmic, that is, γ =0 ,t h e n
we ﬁnd the familiar result that C/W = β. Only changes in the subjective
discount rate alter consumption-wealth ratio.
3.2 Growth
The equilibrium mean rate of growth of assets, shown in (24), is standard in
the literature16. First, we review the impact of variables that do not refer
either to risk or public spending on the rate of growth of assets. Thus a
higher subjective discount rate, β, reduces unambiguously the rate of growth
since dedicating resources to consumption becomes more attractive whereas
investment is discouraged. In addition, a higher gross rate of return of the
asset portfolio, ρ, increases the rate of growth, even though consumption-
wealth ratio may rise.
Second, we study the impact of variables related to risk, but not aﬀected
by the behavior of the public sector. Thus a change in the parameter γ
generates an ambiguous eﬀect on the growth rate. Next, an increase in the
variance of domestic productivity shocks, σ2
y, shifting investment towards
foreign capital, tends to increase the rate of growth, on the one hand, if
α∗ > α. On the other hand, the growth-enhancing eﬀect is reinforced
when γ < 0 since consumption-wealth ratio falls due to an increase in σ2
y
(Turnovsky, 1997, p. 442). Similarly, an increase in the variance of the
16See Turnovsky (1997, Ch. 11) for more details on the impact of changes in exogenous
variables on the rate of growth of wealth.
19foreign productivity shocks, σ2
y∗, making domestic capital more attractive,
tends to increase the rate of growth if α > α∗.T h ep o s i t i v ee ﬀect on the rate
of growth is strengthened if γ < 0: consumption-wealth ratio falls due to an
increase in σ2
y∗.
Third, the impact of the public sector on the rate of growth is analyzed. A
higher size of the public sector, g, increases, on the one hand, unambiguously
the rate of growth since it raises the gross rate of return of the asset portfolio,
ρ. On the other hand, consumption-wealth ratio can fall or raise, as we
showed in section 3.1 above. Then the overall eﬀect of increasing the size of
the public sector on the rate of growth depends on which of the two eﬀects
(on ρ or C/W) dominate. For example, if consumption-wealth ratio falls or
does not change, then a higher size of the public sector enhances growth.
Next, a higher variance of domestic public spending, σ2
z, increases the rate
of growth of the economy for γ < 0, because consumption-wealth ratio falls
(Turnovsky, 1997, p. 444). In contrast, we get the opposite conclusions when
either the covariance of domestic productivity and public spending shocks,
σyz, or the covariance of foreign productivity shocks and public spending
shocks, σy∗z,i n c r e a s e s .
Fourth, in the case of a logarithmic utility function the growth rate is
given by the expression
ψo = ρ − g − β.
Then it is easy to show that, for example, as long as the impact of a higher
size of the public sector, g, on the gross rate of return of the asset portfolio,
ρ, is higher than unity then increasing the size of the public sector is growth-
enhancing.
Finally, we should note that most of the literature shows that the impact
of a higher size of the public sector on growth depends basically on whether
∂ρ/∂g is higher than unity or not. However, our model shows that, once risk
is introduced, then we get a more complex relationship between the size of
the public sector and the rate of growth of wealth.
3.3 Welfare
Economic welfare is given by the value function used to solve the problem
of intertemporal optimization, shown in equation (30). Thus if we totally
diﬀerentiate equation (30), we get, after some algebra, that
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where we observe that only changes in the optimal consumption-wealth ratio
(inﬂuenced by the public sector, risk, and so on) have an impact on economic
welfare. A higher optimal consumption-wealth ratio can improve or deterio-
rate the welfare of the domestic representative agent. Since C/W is positive
in equation (30), the value function can take either positive or negative values,
depending on the sign of the coeﬃcient γ, subject to γV (W) > 0.F o r t h e
case γ < 0 then anything that increases the optimal consumption-wealth
ratio raises welfare. Thus, for example, a higher size of the public sector, if it
increases the optimal consumption-wealth ratio, generates higher welfare if
γ < 0. However, we should note that increasing growth does not necessarily
raise welfare.
3.4 Open versus closed economy
It turns up convenient to obtain the diﬀerence between the variance of the
growth rate in an open economy, shown in equation (23), and the same
variance in a closed economy, shown in equation (27). The diﬀerence between

















y − αα∗σyy∗ − ασyz + α∗σy∗z
∆
,
is the share of the domestic portfolio materialized in foreign capital that
minimizes the variance of the growth rate given by equation (23).
First, if we substract equation (26) from equation (21) we get after some





















21The diﬀerence between both consumption-wealth ratios depends critically
upon the value of the parameter γ.T h u s i f γ < 0 then the consumption-
wealth ratio is higher in an open economy than that in a closed economy,
assuming an interior solution for the value of portfolio shares. An easy way
to explain that result can be found focusing on the case nd = e nd,w h e r e





y∗ − αα∗σyy∗ + ασyz − α∗σy∗z
∆
,
is the share of the domestic portfolio materialized in domestic capital that
minimizes the variance of the growth rate shown in equation (23). Then
we get, from equation (36), that the variance of the growth rate in an open
economy is lower than that in a closed economy, σ2
w,o < σ2
w,c. A reduction
of the variance of the growth rate is equivalent to an increase in the gross
rate of return of the asset portfolio. That, in turn, originates a negative
substitution eﬀect and a positive income eﬀect on the consumption-wealth
ratio. For example, if γ < 0 then the income eﬀect is stronger than the
substitution eﬀect and the consumption-wealth ratio in an open economy is
higher than that in a closed economy. Additionally, the higher the value of
the optimal share of the domestic portfolio materialized in foreign capital,
n∗
d,t h eh i g h e rt h ed i ﬀerence between the results of an open economy with
those of a closed economy.
S e c o n d ,w ec a nc o m p a r et h er a t eo fg r o w t hi na no p e ne c o n o m yw i t h
that in a closed economy departing from the equation (24) corresponding to
an open economy and substracting from it that corresponding to a closed
economy
ψo − ψc = n
∗
d(α














T h u st h er a t eo fg r o w t hi na no p e ne c o n o m yc a nb eh i g h e rt h a n ,e q u a lt oo r
lower than that in a closed economy, depending on the signs of two terms.
For example, for γ < 0:
• If α ≥ α∗ t h e nt h er a t eo fg r o w t ho fw e a l t hi na no p e ne c o n o m yi sl o w e r
than that in a closed economy. Consumption-wealth ratio in an open
economy is higher than that in a closed economy and, additionally, if
α ≥ α∗ then the gross rate of return of the asset portfolio in an open
economy is lower than or equal to the marginal physical product of the
domestic capital.
22• If α > α∗ t h e nt h er a t eo fg r o w t ho fa s s e t si na no p e ne c o n o m yc a nb e
higher than, equal to or lower than that in a closed economy.
Table 3.2. sums up the comparison between the rate of growth in an open
economy with that in a closed economy
Table 3.2. Comparing rates of growth
γ > 0 γ =0 γ < 0
α > α∗ ψo Q ψc ψo < ψc ψo < ψc
α = α∗ ψo > ψc ψo = ψc ψo < ψc
α < α∗ ψo > ψc ψo > ψc ψo Q ψc
Finally, focusing on welfare, since consumption-wealth ratio in an open
economy should be higher than that in a closed economy for γ < 0,a ss h o w n
above in equation (37), then welfare should be higher in a risky open economy
than in a risky closed economy. Please note that welfare, which is given by the
value function in (30), depends mainly on consumption-wealth ratio. This
result adds insights to those shown in Obstfeld (1994) and Turnovsky (1997,
Ch. 11), where they analyze the impact on welfare when changing from a
domestic closed economy with low-yield and no risk (or relatively low risk)
assets to an open economy with high-yield and high-risk assets, among other
things. Obstfeld (1994, p. 1326-27) showed that “international risk-sharing
can yield substantial welfare gains through its positive eﬀect on expected
consumption growth. The mechanism linking global diversiﬁcation to growth
is the attendant world portfolio shift from safe, but low-yield, capital into
riskier, high-yield capital”. Additionally, Turnovsky (1997, p. 439) showed
that for a logarithmic utility function “the higher growth rate more than
oﬀsets the additional risk, and the opportunity to invest in a higher return,
higher risk foreign asset improves welfare”. However, we should note that
our conclusion is not based on low risk-high risk considerations, but on closed
economy-open economy considerations, provided that the size of the public
sector is exogenously given. In addition, we should point out that this result
depends exclusively on the sign of the parameter γ.
234 THE OPTIMAL SIZE OF THE PUBLIC
SECTOR
Now we turn to the size of the public sector g that maximizes welfare or,
for short, the optimal size of the public sector. A crucial characteristic of
the model is that domestic productive government expenditure generates an
externality on the foreign economy, and viceversa. That leads us to consider
two diﬀerent scenarios in an open economy. In the ﬁrst scenario we assume
that the domestic public sector only takes into account the impact of public
spending on the domestic economy and not that impinged on the foreign
economy: the domestic productive public sector does not internalize the
externality. Thus we get a unilateral (or one-sided) optimal size of the public
sector, which is perceived individually as optimal, but it is not for the world
as a whole. In the second scenario we assume that the domestic public
sector takes into account the impact of public spending on both domestic
and foreign economies, that is, the domestic public sector internalizes the
externality. Thus we obtain a harmonized size of the public sector which is
optimal for the world as a whole.
In addition, we obtain the optimal size for a domestic closed economy.
Next, we discuss whether the size of the public sector that maximizes welfare
coincides with that which maximizes growth. Finally, we analyze whether
more open economies are associated with a higher optimal size of the public
sector, ﬁrst on the more simple case where public spending only inﬂuences
productivity, but not volatility, and later on the more general case. For
simplicity, we assume in this section that σyy∗ = σyz = σy∗z = σyz∗ =
σy∗z∗ =0 .
4.1 Open economy: the unilateral optimal size
In the ﬁrst scenario in an open economy we assume that the domestic public
sector takes into account the impact of public spending on the domestic
economy only. Thus the domestic public sector does not internalize the
externality caused in the foreign economy. To obtain the unilateral optimal
size of the public sector we diﬀerentiate partially the expression in the right
hand side of the Bellman equation (14) with respect to g, and then substi-
tuting the value function (30) into the result obtained, we get that




y − 1=0 , (38)
24where ˆ go,u denotes the unilateral optimal size of the public sector. Equation
(38) means that, at the optimal size, the marginal return of an additional
unit of public spending, (δ − θˆ go,u)nd − (1 − γ)(δ − θˆ go,u)n2
dσ2
y,m u s tb e
equal to the marginal cost, 1. The marginal return of public spending
includes, in turn, the productive eﬀect, (δ − θˆ go,u)nd, plus the volatility
eﬀect, −(1 − γ)(δ − θˆ go,u)n2
dσ2
y in the domestic economy only.17
From equation (38) the unilateral optimal size of the public sector in an










1 − (1 − γ)ndσ2
y
¤ , (39)
where both productive and volatility eﬀects determine the optimal size of
the public sector. The terms in the numerator capture the ﬁrst order eﬀects
on growth and volatility and the terms in the denominator the second order
eﬀects.
4.2 Open economy: the harmonized optimal size
In the second scenario in an open economy we begin by assuming that the
external eﬀect of domestic public spending is internalized. The preferences of
the central planner are represented by the sum of two isoelastic intertemporal


















∗ < 1. (40)
The dynamics of domestic wealth are given by equations (10), (11) and
(12). Foreign wealth, in turn, evolves according to equations (33), (34), and
(35).
17Please note that we assumed above that g<δ/θ < 1. In addition, for the unilateral
optimal size of the public sector ˆ go,u to be positive, the marginal return derived from
public spending is required to be higher than its marginal cost for ˆ go,u =0 ,t h a ti s ,
ndδ
£
1 − (1 − γ)αndσ2
y
¤
> 1. Furthermore, the second order condition for g,t h a ti s ,
concavity with respect to g, requires that 1 − (1 − γ)αndσ2
y > 0.
25The objective of the central planner would consist in choosing the sizes
of the public sectors, g and g∗, that maximize (40), subject to W(0) = W0,
W∗(0) = W∗
0, (10), (11), (12), (33), (34), and (35).























subject to the restrictions (10), (11), (12), (33), (34), (35), and given initial
wealth.




































Now we focus on the case where both economies grow at the same rate,
or in a broader sense, where the rates of growth of both economies do not
diﬀer very much. That has been, in fact, the path followed traditionally
in the literature on two-country endogenous growth models. In addition to
tractability reasons, the literature has emphasized that if it were not the
case that both economies grow at the same rate then one would become
inﬁnitely big compared to the other (Razin and Yuen, 1993; Lejour and
Verbon, 1996). Thus if we restrict to the case where consumption-wealth
ratio, portfolio shares and the size of the public sector are the same in both
countries, then domestic wealth and foreign wealth should grow at the same
rate and we obtain a clear-cut solution.18 Before going ahead, we should
note that assuming that both economies grow at the same rate implies that
the external eﬀect of the domestic economy on the foreign economy is equal
to the external eﬀect of the foreign economy on the domestic economy or,
alternatively since the public sector budget is balanced, that tax revenues on




W∗, g = g∗, dz = dz∗, γ = γ∗,a n d
β = β
∗.
26the domestic economy paid by foreigners are equal to tax revenues on the
foreign economy paid by domestic residents.
We diﬀerentiate partially the right hand side of equation (42) with respect
to the harmonized optimal size of the public sector, g, in order to obtain the
ﬁrst order condition of this optimization. Substituting the value function
(30) into the result obtained, we have that
(δ − θb go,h)nd
£

















− 1=0 , (43)
where b go,h denotes the harmonized optimal size of the public sector. Equation
(43) shows that, at the optimal size, the marginal return of public spending,
(δ − θb go,h)nd
£


















must equalize the marginal cost, 1. The marginal return of public spen-
ding, in turn, reﬂects the impact of spending on the domestic economy,
(δ − θb go,h)nd
£
1 − (1 − γ)ndασ2
y
¤










,b o t hi nt e r m so fp r o d u c t i v i t ya n dv o -
latility.19 Thus we get from equation (43) that the harmonized optimal size



























The terms in the numerator capture the ﬁrst order eﬀects on growth and
volatility, weighted by the appropriate portfolio shares, whereas the terms in
the denominator reﬂect second order eﬀects.
4.3 Closed economy
Turning to the domestic closed economy, we could obtain the optimal size
of the public sector, ˆ gc, solving the corresponding problem for the domestic
19That the harmonized optimal size of the public sector ˆ go,h is positive requires that the
marginal return derived from public spending higher than its marginal cost for ˆ go,h =0 .
This implies that ndδ
£










> 1. The second
order condition for g requires that 1 − (1 − γ)αndσ2
y > 0 and 1 − (1 − γ)α∗n∗
dσ2
y∗ > 0.
27representative agent by setting nd =1in any of both above equations (38)
or (43)
(δ − θb gc) − (1 − γ)(δ − θb gc)ασ
2
y − 1=0 , (45)











1 − (1 − γ)ασ2
y
¤ . (46)
Please note that the optimal size of the public sector in a foreign closed
economy can be found, in turn, by setting nd =0in equation (44).






The mathematical result in (47) cannot be compared to that found in Barro
(1990): the optimal size of the public sector in Barro (1990) is equal to the
exponent on public spending in a Cobb-Douglas production function that
exhibits constant returns to scale.20 Instead, our approach to incorporate
public spending has been diﬀerent as we showed in Section 2.1, following
Gallaway and Vedder (1995) and Vedder and Gallaway (1998). However, the
important point is that we can compare the results obtained in equations
(39) and (44) to benchmark results in equations (46) or (47) in our model.
Therefore, we can compare the conclusions derived from our model with
those of the core literature, even though we cannot compare the mathematical
results in equations (39), (44), (46), and (47) of our model vis-à-vis those of
the core literature.
We ﬁnd that the optimal size of the public sector in a closed economy with
risk, given by (46), is lower than that with no risk, given by (47). This result
was already shown in Turnovsky (1999, p. 899). However, his additional
result that if there were no production risk in the domestic economy “the
20There are additional terms in the optimal size of the public sector shown in Turnovsky
(1998, 1999).
28optimal size of the productive government in the stochastic open economy
coincides with that in the deterministic closed economy” no longer applies.
Thus the harmonized optimal size of the public sector in a stochastic open
economy, given by equation (44), is not necessarily equal to the optimal
size of the public sector in a deterministic closed economy with no domestic
production risk [equation (47)].
4.4 Growth vs. welfare maximizing
Now we can compare the optimal size of the public sector with the size that
maximizes growth, where the rate of growth of assets is shown in equation
(24). Partially diﬀerentiating equation (24) with respect to g,w ed e r i v et h e










1 − γ(1 − γ)ndσ2
y
¤ . (48)
If we substract equation (39) from equation (48), it can be easily shown, after
some algebra, that the unilateral size of the public sector that maximizes the
rate of growth, go,u, is unambiguously higher than the unilateral optimal size
of the public sector, b go,u. That has been shown already in Turnovsky (1998, p.
16): “The intuition is that the maximization of the growth rate entails more
risk than the risk averse agent, concerned with his time proﬁle of consump-
tion, ﬁnds to be optimal”. The result that welfare maximizing and growth
maximizing objectives do not amount to the same thing has already been
derived in other contexts, such as models where productive public spending
inﬂuences costs of adjustment of new investment, where the productive good
provided by the public sector is introduced as a stock, instead of as a ﬂow
[see Turnovsky (2003, p. 20) for more details and references] or where the
representative agent is not risk averse (Turnovsky, 1998, p. 16). In addition,
we should note that in case public spending is regarded to be volatility-
reducing (besides productivity-enhancing) in opposition to our model, then
we would conclude that the unilateral optimal size of the public sector, b go,u,
is higher than that which maximizes growth, go,u. Instead, if there is no
risk then both maximizing welfare and growth are equivalent in the case
of Cobb-Douglas production function (Barro, 1990, pp. S111-S112)21.I n
21However, if the production function were not Cobb-Douglas “the relative size of
government that maximizes utility turns out to exceed the value that maximizes the
29addition, the results obtained for the unilateral optimal size can be easily
extended to the harmonized optimal size and to the optimal size in a risky
closed economy.
4.5 Open versus closed economy
Now we discuss whether higher values of holdings of foreign capital out of
domestic wealth, n∗
d, that is, more open economies, are associated with a
higher optimal size of the public sector (Turnovsky, 1999).
4.5.1 A digression: productive-only spending
The case where public spending inﬂuences productivity only is analyzed. The
results of the model become much simpler. If the impact of public spending
on volatility is null then we have that the domestic production function in
equation (4) becomes
dY = αKdt+ αKdy,
where α was given by equation (5) and it is aﬀected by the size of the public
sector. Instead, the parameter α is a constant and it is not inﬂuenced by the
size of the public sector. It is easy to show that the optimal size of the public
sector in a domestic closed economy is equal to that where there is no risk,
given by equation (47). Symmetrically, the optimal size of the public sector
in a foreign closed economy, ˆ g∗








First, we can establish going back to equation (39) that the unilateral





growth rate [...] if and only if the magnitude of the elasticity of substitution between
g [the quantity of public services provided to each household-producer] and k [capital per
worker] is greater than unity” (Barro, 1990, p. S112).
30It can be easily checked that the optimal size of the public sector in a closed
economy, ˆ gc, is unambiguously higher than the unilateral optimal size of the
public sector, go,u, for interior values of portfolio shares. The reason behind it
is that the higher the value of the portfolio share n∗
d is, the lower the level of
internalization of the externality is. The domestic public sector ﬁnds optimal
to reduce the unilateral optimal size since the beneﬁt of public spending for
the domestic public sector becomes lower. Additionally, the more open the
domestic economy is, that is, the higher the value of the portfolio share n∗
d,
then the lower the unilateral optimal size of the public sector is.
Second, we can establish following equation (46) that the harmonized









which implies that the harmonized optimal size of the public sector in an open
economy is always between the values of the optimal size of the public sector
in both closed economies. That is not surprising since the world economy is
a closed economy after all. Then it can be easily shown for the harmonized
optimal size that
sgn(b go,h − b gc)=sgn(b g
∗
c − b gc).
Thus, for example, we ﬁnd that the harmonized optimal size of the public
sector, b go,h, is higher than the optimal size in domestic closed economy, b gc,i f
and only if b g∗
c > b gc, that is, the optimal size of the public sector in a foreign
closed economy is higher than that in a domestic closed economy. The reason
behind it is that in that case the marginal impact of public spending is higher
in a foreign economy.
4.5.2 The general case
Now we turn to the more general case where public spending inﬂuences vo-
latility as well as productivity. To begin with, the ﬁrst order condition for
the unilateral optimal size of the public sector in an open economy b go,u is
given by equation (38), whereas for the case of a closed economy, b gc,i sg i v e n
by equation (45). Comparing equations (38) and (45) we observe that, on
the one hand, the impact of public spending on productivity, (δ − θg)nd,i s
31l o w e ri na no p e ne c o n o m yt h a ni nac l o s e de c o n o m y ,δ − θg,f o rt h es a m e
size of the public sector, g, as we showed above in section 4.5.1. On the
other hand, the inﬂuence of public spending on volatility is higher (that is,
l e s sn e g a t i v e )i na no p e ne c o n o m y ,−(1 − γ)(δ − θg)αn2
dσ2
y,t h a ni nac l o s e d
economy, −(1 − γ)(δ − θg)ασ2
y, for the same size g,s i n c et h ei m p a c ti na n
open economy depends on the share of the portfolio materialized in domestic
capital, nd. Thus the net impact depends upon which of the eﬀects dominate.
For example, obtaining that the unilateral optimal size of the public sector
in an open economy b go,u is higher than that in a closed economy b gc implies
that if we introduce b go,u in equation (45) for the ﬁrst order condition of the
optimal size in a closed economy then we should have that
(δ − θb go,u) − (1 − γ)(δ − θb go,u)ασ
2
y < 1, (50)
due to the second order condition required for the size of the public sector
g to be a maximum. Combining both equations (38) and (50), and after
some algebra, we get that the unilateral optimal size will be higher than the
optimal size in a closed economy if and only if
(1 − γ)(δ − θb go,u)(1+nd)ασ
2
y > (δ − θb go,u).
Second, the harmonized optimal size of the public sector is given by
equation (43). If we compare equation (43) with equation (45) we can easily
show that, on the one hand, the impact of public spending on productivity
in an open economy, (δ − θg)nd+(δ
∗ − θ
∗g)n∗
d, compared to that in a closed
economy, δ − θg,f o rt h es a m es i z eg, depends on the diﬀerence between the
optimal size of the public sector in a foreign closed economy b g∗
c s h o w ni n( 4 9 )
and that in a domestic closed economy b gc given by (47), as we showed above
in section 4.5.1. For example, if b g∗
c > b gc then the impact of public spen-
ding on productivity is higher in an open economy than in a closed economy.
On the other hand, the impact of public spending on volatility in an open
economy,












in relation to that in a closed economy, −(δ − θg)(1− γ)ασ2
y, depends
mainly on the variances of productivity shocks in both economies and the
values of the portfolio shares nd and n∗
d. For example, to get that the
harmonized optimal size of the public sector b go,h is higher than that in a
32closed economy b gc involves that substituting b go,h in equation (45) for the ﬁrst
order condition for the optimal size in a domestic closed economy implies that
(δ − θb go,h) − (1 − γ)(δ − θb go,h)ασ
2
y < 1. (51)
so that the second order condition for the optimal size g is satisﬁed. If
we combine equation (43) with equation (51), then we obtain, after some
algebra, the result that b go,h > b gc provided that
(δ
∗ − θ
∗b go,h)+( 1− γ)(δ − θb go,h)(1+nd)ασ
2
y >








In equation (52) we observe ﬁrst the result obtained above in section 4.5.1 for
productive-only spending: the harmonized optimal size of the public sector,
b go,h, will be higher than that in a domestic closed economy, b gc, if and only if
the optimal size of the public sector in a foreign closed economy b g∗
c is higher
than that in a domestic closed economy b gc. In addition, we have that the
impact of public spending on volatility in an open economy can be higher
or lower than that in a closed economy. However, under most conditions
the impact will be higher (that is, less negative) in an open economy. For
example, if we focus for simplicity on the case where the marginal product
in both countries is equal, that is, α = α∗, the marginal impact of public
spending on productivity is equal in both economies, that is, δ − θb go,h =
δ
∗−θ
∗b go,h, and the variances of productivity shocks are similar, then we know
from section 3.4 that the variance of the growth rate in an open economy
is lower than that in a closed economy, σ2
w,o < σ2
w,c, as given by equation
(36). In addition, since the impact on volatility is the only factor that can
originate a diﬀerence between the optimal size in an open economy and that
in a closed economy, then we conclude that the harmonized optimal size of
the public sector in an open economy is higher than in a closed economy
because the impact on volatility is higher (that is, less negative) in an open
economy than in a closed economy.
These results oﬀer additional insights to those of Turnovsky (1999), where
a more open economy is unambiguously associated with a higher optimal
size in an open economy, provided that the domestic economy holds positive
stocks of foreign capital in a small open economy. Here we have found two
reasons why the harmonized optimal size of the public sector in an open
economy should be higher than that in a closed economy. The ﬁrst one
is based on the fact that the optimal size of the public sector in a foreign
33closed economy b g∗
c c a nb eh i g h e rt h a nt h a ti nad o m e s t i cc l o s e de c o n o m yb gc.
That depends upon the diﬀerence in the marginal impact of public spending
on productivity in both countries. The second reason has to do with risk
diversiﬁcation. Since the impact of public spending on volatility is surely
higher (that is, less negative) in an open economy than in a closed economy,
that makes that the harmonized optimal size of the public sector in an open
economy should be higher than that in a closed economy. Turnovsky (1999,
p. 889) bases his result on “the country’s ability to export its domestic
risk, rather than due to insulating the country from foreign risk, as argued
by Rodrik [1998]”. We should note that our argument based on the higher
impact of public spending on volatility due to risk diversiﬁcation argument
more Rodrik’s (1998, p. 1011) “insulation function” than Turnovsky’s “risk
exporting” argument. However, Rodrik emphasizes the central role that the
public sector plays in insulating against external risk, whereas here the result
is the consequence of the risk diversiﬁcation achieved through perfect capital
mobility.
5C O N C L U S I O N S
The impact of productive public spending and risk on long run growth is an
important issue for economic policy. However, the analysis has been mostly
relegated either to a closed economy or an small open economy. This paper
extends a two-country stochastic AK growth model based on Turnovsky
(1997, Ch. 11) incorporating a production good that enhances both the pro-
ductivity of physical marginal product of private capital and volatility [Barro
(1990) for the original deterministic model and Turnovsky (1998, 1999) for an
extension to a risky closed economy and a small open economy, respectively].
The main conclusions can be
First, having obtained the world equilibrium, we review how consumption-
wealth ratio, the rate of growth of assets and welfare respond to changes in
exogenous variables, provided that the size of the public sector is exoge-
nously given. Most of the results are familiar. However, we have shown
that a higher size of the public sector, enhancing productivity and volatility,
implies a richer analysis about the impact on the consumption-wealth ratio
and the rate of growth. For example, if the net impact of a higher size of
the public sector is positive then consumption-wealth should raise. Since
welfare depends basically on consumption-wealth ratio, then public spending
34inﬂuences welfare altering consumption-wealth ratio.
Second, we have compared the behavior of key economic variables in an
open economy in contrast to a closed economy. Since an open economy can
achieve a lower variance of the rate of growth through risk diversiﬁcation,
then consumption-wealth ratio should be higher in an open economy than in
a closed economy, assuming that the size of the public sector is exogenously
g i v e n . N e x t ,w eh a v es h o w nt h a tt h er a t eo fg r o w t hi na no p e ne c o n o m y
is lower than that in a closed economy if the marginal physical product of
domestic capital is higher than that of foreign capital. Additionally we should
note that welfare should be higher in open economy than in a closed economy,
since welfare depends upon consumption-wealth ratio.
Third, we have obtained the optimal size of the public sector in an open
economy. Since domestic productive government expenditure generates an
externality on the foreign economy in the model we have considered two
diﬀerent scenarios in an open economy. In the ﬁrst scenario we assume that
the domestic productive public sector only takes into account the impact
of productive government spending on the domestic economy and not that
impinged on the foreign economy. In the second scenario we assume that the
domestic productive public sector takes into account the impact of productive
government spending on both domestic and foreign economies. We should
note that obtaining a closed form harmonized optimal size requires assuming
that both economies grow exactly at the same rate. It has been derived
that the optimal size of the public sector in a closed economy with risk is
lower than that with no risk, as is Turnovsky (1999). However, we have
shown that in case there is no domestic production risk then the harmonized
optimal size of the public sector in an open economy does not have to be equal
to the optimal size in a domestic closed economy necessarily, in contrast to
Turnovsky (1999). Next, we obtained that the size that maximizes welfare is
lower than that which maximizes growth due to risk aversion, as in Turnovsky
(1998).
Fourth, we have compared the optimal size of the public sector in an
open economy with that of a closed economy. In the case public spending is
productive only, we ﬁnd that the unilateral optimal size of the public sector
in an open economy should be unambiguously lower than that in a closed eco-
nomy since public spending is not fully internalized. In contrast, we conclude
that the harmonized optimal size of the public sector should be higher than
that in a closed economy provided that the optimal size of the public in a
foreign closed economy is higher than in a domestic closed economy. The
35marginal impact of public spending on productivity is higher abroad than at
home. In the more general case where public spending inﬂuences volatility
as well, we conclude that the unilateral optimal size of the public sector will
be higher than that in a domestic closed economy if and only if the marginal
impact on volatility is higher (less negative) than that on productivity. As
regards the harmonized case, we argue that there are two channels through
which the harmonized optimal size of the public sector should be higher than
that in a domestic closed economy. The ﬁrst channel is that the optimal size
of the public sector in a foreign closed economy should be higher than that
in a domestic closed economy, as argued in the productive-only case. The
second channel has to do with the higher positive impact (that is, less nega-
tive) of public spending on volatility in an open economy than in a closed
economy due to risk diversiﬁcation. We ﬁnd that the second channel goes
along the same lines of the argument in Rodrik (1998) about insulating an
open economy from external risk through the intervention of the public sector
rather than that in Turnovsky (1999) about the ability to export domestic
risk. However, Rodrik attributes a central role to the public sector, while
here our argument is based on the relatively lower impact of public spen-
ding on volatility achieved by the risk diversiﬁcation in a world with perfect
capital mobility.
Fifth, we should note that this model can easily be extended so that
public spending, instead of being volatility-enhancing, is volatility-reducing.
That would reverse most of the conclusions of this paper. For example,
it can be easily shown that if public spending is volatility-reducing as well
as productivity-enhancing then the size of the public sector that maximizes
welfare should be higher than that which maximizes growth. Further, it
implies signiﬁcative changes as regards the conclusions about the optimal
size of the public sector in an open economy as compared to those in a closed
economy.
Finally, we must note that the model has important limitations. We
have analyzed the equilibrium in a world economy where, even though the
domestic and the foreign economies are diﬀerent, the representative agents
are identical, and the equilibrium is characterized by identical balanced
growth rates. Therefore, it is not suitable to study structural diﬀerences
between countries, but it could be useful for countries where their rates of
growth are quite similar. Additionally, we should point out possible paths
for future research. We could relax the assumption of continuous budget
equilibrium and introduce public bonds in the model. However, that would
36increase enormously the complexity of the model. Introducing money is also
an interesting element that could be integrated in a two-country world eco-
nomy. The incorporation of congestion in the provision of the consumption
good would be another possibility to extend the model. The inclusion of more
complex strategic interaction would be an additional interesting feature.
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